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Land use regulation 
Geographic constraints 
a b s t r a c t 
We provide empirical evidence that increases in housing rental income lead to a larger supply response than price 
increases of the same percentage value. We rationalize this differential in supply responsiveness with an ampli- 
fication mechanism arising from a downward revision of capitalization rates following a rental income increase. 
We document that the amplification of the housing supply price elasticity is less pronounced in geographically 
constrained and tightly regulated neighborhoods and areas having more sophisticated investors. Our findings 
















































Existing research emphasizes the importance of housing supply price
lasticity for a variety of economic outcomes. The responsiveness of
ousing supply affects, among other things, housing cycles, the allo-
ation of labor across space, and the degree of capitalization of public
olicies such as place-based subsidies. 1 However, to date, we know rel-
tively little about the responsiveness of housing supply with respect
o changes in rents. This is surprising, as urban economic theory typi-
ally focuses on periodic housing costs, and many public policies such
s rent control and housing subsidies directly act on the rental income
enerated by real estate properties. In this paper, we investigate under
hich circumstances the housing supply responsiveness to changes in
ents differs from the supply responsiveness to price changes and why
he ratio of rent and price elasticities varies across regions. 
We start by developing a partial equilibrium framework featuring
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yourko (2018) and Hilber (2017) for a synthesis. 
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nalysis and, in particular, motivates the identification strategy used
o estimate housing supply elasticities. Second, it allows us to rational-
ze differences in the estimated supply responsiveness to rent and price
ynamics. We show that local changes in investors’ expectations about
ental income growth and risk premia are decisive to explain supply dif-
erences. Specifically, the housing supply response to changes in prices
nd rents is identical if capitalization rates do not adjust to changes in
ents. If capitalization rates do adjust, housing supply price elasticities
re either amplified or dampened by this adjustment. 
Next, we bring the theoretical framework to the data and estimate
he average responsiveness of housing supply with respect to price and
ent changes at the neighborhood level. To do so, we use detailed georef-
renced data on advertised residential properties and building stock for
witzerland covering the period 2005–2015. We find that an increase
n rents leads to an about thrice as large supply increase than an in-
rease of prices of the same percentage value: The supply response fol-runetti, Guillaume Chapelle, David Geltner, Lu Han, Christian Hilber, Albert 
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3 Relatedly, Solé-Ollé and Viladecans-Marsal (2012) analyze the role of po- owing a ten percent increase in square meter rents (prices) is approx-
mately 14 percent (four percent). According to our framework, these
esults suggest that, on average, real estate investors revise capitaliza-
ion rates downward following a positive demand shock. This revision,
n turn, amplifies the supply response to price changes. We document
hat the supply amplification, and the corresponding adjustment of ex-
ectations, are heterogeneous across space. Geographically constrained
nd tightly regulated markets – i.e., major urban areas and alpine tourist
reas – and neighborhoods having more sophisticated buyers as proxied
y landlords, institutional investors, or second-home investors display
ower amplification values. 
Switzerland is an excellent laboratory to investigate housing supply
ue to substantial heterogeneity in the local factors influencing it. The
ecentralized form of government grants low-tier political units (mu-
icipalities) large autonomy in land use planning and fiscal policies.
eographic features of the landscape, such as elevation, slope, and ter-
ain ruggedness, also vary considerably across space. These character-
stics of the country make the reaction of housing supply contingent on
ocalized factors. Importantly, the owner-occupied and rental markets
re approximate of equal size in Switzerland, which facilitates the es-
imation of rental and price supply elasticities throughout the country,
hereby allowing us to study the role of capitalization rates for housing
upply. 2 Finally, the existence of detailed information on property-level
ousing characteristics allows us to rule out that different attributes –
.e., a quality gap – between properties drive the differences in supply
lasticities. 
Our paper bridges two strands of the literature. The first strand fo-
uses on the estimation of local housing supply price elasticities. Despite
he importance of housing supply elasticity, papers quantifying it remain
carce. Gyourko and Molloy (2015) provide a comprehensive review of
he literature investigating the estimation and determinants of housing
upply. In his seminal article, Saiz (2010) estimates housing supply elas-
icities across U.S. Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) as a function of
eographic and regulatory constraints. Using a Vector Error Correction
odel, Wheaton et al. (2014) also estimate housing supply elasticities
or U.S. MSA’s, obtaining estimates in line with those of Saiz (2010) .
aum-Snow and Han, 2021 adopt a structural approach to quantify
ross- and within-city housing supply elasticities for U.S. metropolitan
reas, showing that housing supply elasticities increase monotonically
ith the distance to city centers. While relying on Saiz (2010) empirical
pecification for estimating inverse housing supply elasticities, we fol-
ow a similar identification strategy as in Baum-Snow and Han, 2021 .
pecifically, we identify housing supply elasticities using local demand
hocks triggered by the historic spatial distribution of sectoral employ-
ent shares and the connectivity of a neighborhood with local labor
arkets. As a complementary shift-share instrument, we use the histor-
cal distribution of language shares across Swiss neighborhoods com-
ined with the growth of language groups at aggregate levels. 
The second strand of the literature focuses on how investors’ ex-
ectations impact market dynamics. Time variation in expectations
as captured by price to rent ratios dynamics – have been used
y Case and Shiller (2003) to identify bubble-like behavior. By con-
tructing a user cost model incorporating economic fundamentals,
immelberg et al. (2005) show that expected house price apprecia-
ion plays an important role in explaining local U.S. price dynamics.
ocusing on the U.S. housing boom in the early 2000s, Ben-David et al.,
019 show that agents invest in vacant homes if they expect further
rice increases. Kaplan et al. (2020) highlight the role of expectations
or house price and rent movements around the Great Recession. 
The importance of expectations for market dynamics has sparked
nterest in the way individuals form expectations. Mayer and






2 n house price booms. Sivitanides et al. (2010) find that capitalization
ates behave similarly to price/earnings ratios, with economic agents
orming price growth expectations based on past dynamics. Glaeser and
athanson, 2017 construct a model where buyers are not entirely ratio-
al in predicting future price dynamics, which explains observed price
orrelation over time. Kuchler and Zafar (2019) show that individuals
orm expectations about house price dynamics from recent personal ex-
eriences. The fact that investors are myopic, or backward-looking, is in
ine with our findings, which suggest that investors expect further rent
rowth in locations that have experienced demand increases in the re-
ent past. Using spatial variation, we show that part of the local housing
upply response to demand shocks is affected by changes in investors’
xpectations. 
We also relate to the literature on local geographic and regulatory
onstraints (e.g., Aura and Davidoff, 2008, Hilber and Vermeulen, 2016 ,
nd Lutz and Sand, 2019 ) and show that price supply elasticities are de-
ermined not only by regulation and geographic constraints but also by
djusting capitalization rates. 3 Hilber and Mense (2021) show that la-
or demand shocks in conjunction with supply constraints explain most
f the increase in the price-to-rent ratio in Greater London over the last
wo decades. 
Our contribution to the literature is threefold. First, we empirically
stablish a link between housing supply responsiveness and investors
xpectations. This link is essential, as public policies affecting rental in-
ome might lead to unanticipated consequences in the supply of housing
ue to changes in expectations. Second, our empirical analysis quantifies
he spatial dynamics of local expectations. Specifically, we provide novel
vidence that the adaptation of investors expectations occurs at the local
evel and that such adjustment is consistent with a path-dependent view
f spatial development. Investors expect that places that have gained in
ttractiveness (i.e., experienced a positive demand shock) will continue
o do so, as reflected by a decrease in capitalization rates, leading to ad-
itional housing development. Third, we show that the housing supply
lasticity varies considerably within and across urban areas due to the
ne-scale impact of geographic and regulatory constraints. This varia-
ion leads to a spatially heterogeneous capitalization of global demand
hocks that cannot be observed when estimating the housing supply elas-
icity at the urban area level, as done by previous research. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 in-
roduces the conceptual framework motivating our empirical
nalysis. Section 3 explains our empirical identification strategy.
ection 4 presents the data and provides descriptive statistics for the
wiss housing market. We discuss the results in Section 5 and provide
everal robustness checks in Section 6 . Section 7 concludes. 
. Conceptual framework 
The following partial equilibrium framework allows us to formal-
ze the identification assumptions underlying the empirical analysis and
ationalize corresponding findings. We specify the supply and demand
ide of the housing market and outline the role played by real estate
nvestors. 4 
.1. Housing developers 
As in Glaeser (2008) , in each neighborhood 𝑛 , housing developers
hoose the amount of housing space to develop. To build housing, de-
elopers must pay the price 𝑃 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑 
𝑛 
to acquire land, and the local con-
truction cost 𝑐 𝑛 to purchase building materials and remunerate labor.itical competition for residential development. Lin and Wachter, 2020 docu- 
ent spillover effects of local regulatory constraints on neighboring localities, 
osman et al. (2018) analyze housing appreciation and marginal land supply in 
 dynamic framework. 
4 Online Appendix A presents a more detailed derivation of the model. 




































































































ithout loss of generality, we capture both local productivity of the con-
truction sector, as well as the unit cost of inputs, in 𝑐 𝑛 . The developers
rofit optimization problem is given by 
ax 
ℎ 
( 𝑃 𝑛 ℎ𝑙 − 𝑐 𝑛 ℎ 𝛿
𝑖𝑛𝑡 
𝑛 +1 𝑙 − 𝑃 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑 
𝑛 
𝑙) , (1)
here 𝑃 𝑛 is the local price of housing per unit of living space, 𝑙 denotes
he amount of land and ℎ the building height. We assume that the cost
omponent 𝑐 𝑛 ℎ 
𝛿𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑛 +1 𝑙 is convex with respect to building height ( 𝛿𝑖𝑛𝑡 
𝑛 
> 0) ,
escribing the fact that the construction of taller building becomes pro-
ressively costlier due to geographic and regulatory constraints limiting
esidential development on the intensive margin. 5 
Developers choose the optimal intensity of development for each ho-
ogeneous unit of land in the neighborhood. The zero-profit condition
s met and governs the equilibrium price of land 𝑃 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑 
𝑛 
. Total housing
upply is given by the product of optimal building height ℎ ∗ 
𝑛 
and the
mount of developable land 𝐿 𝑛 available in the neighborhood. We as-
ume that the quantity of land available for residential development in
he neighborhood responds endogenously to housing prices according







𝑛 , where ?̄? 𝑛 captures characteristics of locations
hifting land supply, and the parameter 𝛿𝑒𝑥𝑡 
𝑛 
governs the (inverse) re-
ponsiveness of residential land availability (see Online Appendix A).
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here 𝑆 𝑛 = 𝑆 𝑛 ( ̄𝐿 𝑛 , 𝑐 𝑛 , 𝛿𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑛 ) summarizes exogenous housing supply










ponds to the local housing supply price-elasticity, which depends on
he local responsiveness of residential development on the intensive ( 𝛿𝑖𝑛𝑡 )
nd extensive ( 𝛿𝑒𝑥𝑡 ) margin. 6 
.2. Real estate investors 
We build on the framework proposed by DiPasquale and
heaton (1992) and assume that investors are willing to pay a square
eter price 𝑃 𝑛 for a property generating a periodic rental income 𝑅 𝑛 in
eighborhood 𝑛 . Investors thus mediate between the property market
 in which households consume housing services - and housing devel-
pers. 7 We assume that the elasticity of building tenure with regard to
apitalization rate differences between owner-occupied and rental prop-
rties is infinite. Put differently, investors optimally choose whether to
ell or rent out a property, which implies that the capitalization rate
f rental and selling properties is the same. If it were not so, arbitrage
pportunities would arise, leading investors to shift their demand from
ne real estate asset to the other. 8 
We depart from the literature by assuming that investors form ex-
ectations endogenously about local risk-adjusted returns 𝑟 𝑛 and rent
rowth 𝑔 𝑛 according to observed contemporaneous rents and prices,5 Tall and high-rise buildings typically require specific building materials and 
pecialized workers, such as architects and engineers, that ensure the stability of 
ts structure. Additionally, geographic and regulatory constraints become more 
inding, as they are more likely to hinder vertical development. 
6 It is common in the literature to represent housing supply elasticity with 
 single structural parameter 𝜖 entering a housing supply function of the form 
 
𝑠 = 𝑆𝑃 𝜖 , see e.g., Hsieh and Moretti (2019) , Baum-Snow and Han, 2021 , and 
in and Wachter, 2020 . 
7 In the case of owner-occupancy, the investor rents out the real estate asset 
o herself. 
8 We assume that rental and selling units are, on average, identical within a 
iven neighborhood, such that investors’ expectations are the same due to the 
o-arbitrage condition. In Section 3.1 , we thus partial out potential quality dif- 
erences from rent and price dynamics. The no-arbitrage assumption is at the 
ore of the standard user cost approach employed by Hendershott and Slem- 












3 .e., 𝑟 𝑛 = 𝑟 𝑛 ( 𝑅 𝑛 , 𝑃 𝑛 ) and 𝑔 𝑛 = 𝑔 𝑛 ( 𝑅 𝑛 , 𝑃 𝑛 ) . Across periods, investors up-
ate their expectations based on the capital investment they have to
ake and the corresponding rental income they could potentially earn
t that time, thus leading to heterogeneous expectation adjustments
cross neighborhoods. This leads to the formula 𝑃 𝑛 = 
𝑅 𝑛 
𝑖 𝑛 ( 𝑅 𝑛 ,𝑃 𝑛 ) 
, where
 𝑛 = 𝑟 𝑛 ( 𝑅 𝑛 , 𝑃 𝑛 ) − 𝑔 𝑛 ( 𝑅 𝑛 , 𝑃 𝑛 ) is the local capitalization rate. 
Using this simple framework, we can analyze the propagation of
ental income changes to the supply of housing. The relative respon-


























here 𝜖𝑄,𝑃 𝑛 is the standard housing supply price elasticity in Eq. (2) , and
𝑃 ,𝑅 
𝑛 is an amplification coefficient that corresponds to the price elasticity
ith respect to rent changes. This latter is determined by the responsive-
ess of the local capitalization rate to rent changes, i.e., 𝜖𝑃 ,𝑅 𝑛 = 1 − 𝜖
𝑖,𝑅 
𝑛 
see Online Appendix A). Eq. (3) tells us that housing supply responses
o rent and price changes differ when the elasticity of prices to rent
hanges is not unitary. If the valuation of local real estate assets is very
ensitive to local rent changes, i.e., 𝜖𝑃 ,𝑅 𝑛 > 1 , the housing supply will
espond more strongly to rent changes than to price changes. Investors
djustment of growth expectations and local risk captured by the cap-
talization rate determine the elasticity of local prices to local rents. If
hese factors were independent of rent dynamics, we should observe
dentical supply responses to rent and price changes, which is a central
ypothesis we test empirically. 9 
A parametrization of local capitalization rates is instructive to pro-
ide an intuition about the way we differ from the literature and to un-
erstand the identification assumptions exposed in the next section. Let




𝑛 , where 𝑖 0 is the “standard ” capitalization
ate, which the literature usually assumes to be exogenously determined




represent the local elas-
icity of capitalization rates with respect to rent and price shocks. It is
asy to show that the amplification coefficient is pinned down by these
wo parameters via the equation 𝜖𝑃 ,𝑅 𝑛 = 
1− 𝛾𝑅 𝑛 
1+ 𝛾𝑃 𝑛 
. This parametrization par-
imoniously endogenizes capitalization rates while allowing for spatial
ifferences in the investors’ discount rate when evaluating real estate




= 0 , we obtain the standard Gordon growth
odel. Empirically, we test whether this spatial generalization of the
ordon growth model is meaningful. 11 
.3. Residents 
The economy is endowed with a continuous measure of 𝑁 indi-
iduals distributed across neighborhoods. Building on recent work by
onte et al. (2018) , each individual working in industry 𝑘 decides in
hich neighborhood 𝑛 to live and in which area 𝑖 to work. The idiosyn-
ratic indirect utility 𝑈 𝑘 
𝑛𝑖 




( 𝜔 ) = 𝑏 𝑘 
𝑛𝑖 





, (4)9 Note that Eq. (3) is valid for any supply function whose price elasticity is 
escribed by a single parameter. The structure imposed by Eq. (2) only serves the 
urpose of illustrating the identification assumptions underlying the empirical 
stimation. 
10 Our results generalize to a parametrization that allows for local exogenous 
apitalization rates 𝑖 0 𝑛 . In Section 6 , we check the robustness of our results when 
 0 𝑛 includes local measures of liquidity risks and uncertainty in the revenue gen- 
rated by the property. 
11 The existing literature on capitalization rates empirically documents a strong 
eterogeneity in capitalization rates across space, with urban and high-amenity 
reas typically displaying lower capitalization rates. However, the existing ur- 
an literature largely neglects such differences. Our parametrization accommo- 
ates such features. 






































































































𝑛  here we set the price of the tradable numéraire equal to unity and
ssume that individuals spend a share 𝛼 on housing. The variable ?̃? 𝑘 
𝑛𝑖 
enotes the industry-specific wage of workers living in 𝑛 and commuting
o 𝑖 . 
The utility component 𝑏 𝑘 
𝑛𝑖 
captures idiosyncratic preferences that do
ot depend on market fundamentals but, rather, on the exogenous tastes
f workers for a given place of residence/place of work combination. We
ssume such preferences to be i.i.d. realizations of a Fréchet-distributed
andom variable with scale parameter 𝐵 𝑘 
𝑛𝑖 
and shape parameter 𝜀 𝑘 > 1 .
he greater the value of 𝜀 𝑘 , the less heterogeneous are locational pref-
rences of workers in a given industry, thus implying greater mobility
cross space. 
We model ?̃? 𝑘 
𝑛𝑖 
as wage per effective units of labor 𝑊 𝑘 
𝑛𝑖 
divided by
ommuting costs 𝑚 𝑛𝑖 , implying that workers reduce labor supply when
ommuting from distant locations. Our focus being on housing markets,
e do not explicitly model the demand side of labor markets, and con-
ider wages 𝑊 𝑘 
𝑛𝑖 
as an exogenous variable. 12 
Given households homothetic preferences, total housing demand 𝑄 𝑑 
𝑛 







𝑁 𝑛 = 𝛼
1 
𝑅 












) 𝜖𝑘 +1 
, (5)










is the weighted average income earned in





is the total number of households living
n 𝑛 , and Φ is a composite term reflecting the attractiveness of all other
ossible pairs of residence 𝑟 and employment 𝑠 . 13 Eq. (5) provides two
nsights that prove useful when constructing housing demand shifters.
pecifically, we should expect higher housing demand in neighborhoods
hat are i) better connected to productive areas, and ii) attractive along
ne of the dimensions captured by idiosyncratic tastes 𝐵 𝑘 
𝑛𝑖 
. In Section 3 ,
e derive two instruments that capture shifts in housing demand trig-
ered by these two dimensions while remaining exogenous with respect
o housing supply changes. 
.4. Demand shocks, expectations, and housing supply 
In this section, we outline comparative static results on how an ex-
genous demand shock informs us about changes in housing supply and
djustments of expectations. In interest of parsimony, let us denote by
any local shock exclusively affecting the demand side of the housing
arket as described by Eq. (5) , and assume that the periodic cost of




> 0 . 




















The term 𝑃 𝑛 
𝜕𝑖 𝑛 
𝜕𝜃𝑛 
is responsible for the amplification of housing supply
ia changes in capitalization rates following a positive demand shock. 14 
e argue that the response of local capitalization rates to a positive
emand shock is unequivocally negative, i.e. 
𝜕𝑖 𝑛 
𝜕𝜃𝑛 
< 0 , thus increasing the
upply of housing with respect to the standard Gordon Growth model in
hich capitalization rates are exogenously fixed and only the first term
n parentheses remains. 12 Indeed, the identification strategy exposed in Section 3 relies on exogenous 
hanges in local labor demand. For this reason, we refrain to model labor de- 
and endogenously. 
13 See Online Appendix A for a detailed derivation of Eq. (5) . 
14 To keep the notation as simple and general as possible, here we refrain from 
xplicitly formalizing the endogenous relationship between capitalization rates 










4 This negative relationship arises because, following a positive de-




nd/or ii) rent growth expectations increase ( 
𝜕𝑔 𝑛 
𝜕𝜃𝑛 
> 0 ). 15 For example,
n unexpected demand shock 𝜃 capturing improvements of local ameni-
ies, or a relocation of a sufficiently large company, leads to changes in
ocal housing demand and thus alter investors’ expectations. 
Expectations are likely to be formed according to past dynamics
see e.g. DiPasquale and Wheaton, 1995) . Our results are consistent
ith myopic expectation as documented for real estate markets by
uchler and Zafar (2019) . Begley et al. (2019) document that hetero-
eneous expectations about local population growth lead to differences
n local price-rent ratios in the US. As long as the local demand increase
as some unexpected element, myopic investors will adjust their ex-
ectations about the growth rates of rents upwards and thus decrease
apitalization rates. 
The equilibrium feature of rent growth rates makes it extremely dif-
cult to predict them, even when investors have strong predictive capa-
ilities regarding future demand changes. First, housing supply reacts
ndogenously at the local level to the demand shock. Second, even if
 demand shock is initially localized to a given neighborhood, it will
pread throughout the country due to the spatial equilibrium condition.
his makes it very difficult to correctly predict the “final ” effect of a de-
and change based on past dynamics, and it rationalizes the adjustment
f expectations after the realization of a demand change. 16 
We note that the extent to which capitalization rates adjust follow-
ng a positive demand shock arguably depends on the investors’ idiosyn-
ratic characteristic affecting their ability to build expectations. We in-
estigate this matter in more detail in Section 5.3 . 
. Empirical framework 
Based on the above framework, we derive empirical specifications
o estimate housing supply elasticities 𝜖𝑄,𝑃 𝑛 and 𝜖
𝑄,𝑅 
𝑛 , and discuss the
orresponding identification assumptions. We start by imposing aver-
ge supply elasticities 𝜖𝑄,𝑃 and 𝜖𝑄,𝑅 common to all neighborhoods. In
he next step, we provide a parametrization allowing us to estimate het-
rogeneous housing supply responsiveness at the neighborhood level. 
.1. Partialling out quality differences 
The conceptual framework exposed in Section 2 implicitly assumes
hat the quality of housing goods is homogeneous within the same neigh-
orhood and across rental and selling properties. The relatively small
eighborhoods in our principal empirical analysis justify this assump-
ion to a certain extent, as properties sharing similar housing character-
stics tend to cluster together. 
Yet, within a neighborhood, differences in the quality and type of
ousing goods may remain. To prevent potential quality bias, in what
ollows, we remove all price and rent variation across locations that orig-
nate from differences in observable housing characteristics. To this end,
e construct local (log) price and rent indices from hedonic regressions.
pecifically, in each period we separately estimate 
n 𝜏𝑗𝑛𝑡 = 𝛾𝜏𝑛𝑡 + 𝛽
𝜏
𝑡 
𝐀 𝑗𝑛𝑡 + 𝜖𝜏𝑗𝑛𝑡 , 𝜏 = 𝑅, 𝑃 (7)
here 𝜏𝑗𝑛 denotes either the price or rent of property 𝑗 in neighborhood
 at time 𝑡 . The vector 𝐀 𝑗𝑛𝑡 includes a comprehensive set of attributes
uch as housing surface, the average number of rooms, age, age squared,
nd an indicator for single-family vs. multi-family houses. 𝜖𝜏
𝑗𝑛𝑡 
denotes
he error term. 15 Given that rent expectations enter capitalization rates negatively, an in- 
rease in expected rental growth decreases local capitalization rates. 
16 For the instruments used below, we find that past dynamics explain only very 
ittle of the variation such that demand changes cannot be perfectly anticipated 
ased on past dynamics. 













































































































20 We use the estimated neighborhood-time fixed-effects 𝛾𝜏
𝑛𝑡 
as quality-
djusted log-prices (log-rents) ln 𝑃 𝑛𝑡 ( ln 𝑅 𝑛𝑡 ). 17 Note that the coefficients
𝜏
𝑡 
are time-variant, such that the valuation of housing characteristics
an flexibly change from period to period. 
.2. Model-informed identification of average supply elasticities 
Log-linearizing supply Eq. (2) , expressing prices as a function of
uantities, and first differencing, in equilibrium 18 we obtain the fol-
owing empirical specification 
ln 𝑃 𝑛 = 𝛼𝑃 + 
1 
𝜖𝑄,𝑃 
Δ ln 𝑄 𝑛 + Δ ln 𝑆 𝑃 𝑛 , (8)
here 1 
𝜖𝑄,𝑃 
is the average inverse housing supply elasticity common to
ll neighborhoods and Δ denotes a time difference between 2005 and
015. The term 𝛼𝑃 denotes the average value of changes in observed
upply shifters common to all neighborhoods and, in a slight abuse of
otation, Δ ln 𝑆 𝑃 
𝑛 
represents the corresponding mean-centered variable.
ime-invariant components are partialled out from Δ ln 𝑆 𝑃 
𝑛 
by first dif-
erencing, such that only dynamic supply shifters enter Eq. (8) . 
Estimating Eq. (8) by OLS likely leads to biased estimates of the pa-
ameter of interest due to the endogeneity of Δ ln 𝑄 𝑛 via the demand
ide. This is apparent from Eq. (5) when writing changes in housing
emand as 
ln 𝑄 𝑛 = Δ ln ?̄? 𝑛 + Δ ln 𝑁 𝑛 − Δ ln 𝑅 𝑛 . (9)
herefore, estimates of 1 
𝜖𝑄,𝑃 
in Eq. (8) are potentially biased due to i)
 correlation of the components of housing demand changes such as
hanges in average wages and number of residents with changes of un-
bserved supply shifters in Δ ln 𝑆 𝑃 
𝑛 
(omitted variable bias), and ii) the
mpact of housing prices via changes in rents on housing demand (re-
erse causality). 
According to Eq. (2) (see Online Appendix A), Δ ln 𝑆 𝑃 
𝑛 
includes, in
ddition to exogenous supply shifters, changes in local construction cost.
hanges in the price of construction materials and the cost to make land
vailable for residential development are unlikely to differ across space,
ostly due to the small country size. On the contrary, shifts in housing
emand might affect construction costs via wages. 
To partially address differences in construction costs across neigh-
orhoods, we control, in a first step, for several supply shifters in Eq. (8) .
et 𝐗 𝑛 denote the vector containing such controls. 19 In particular, 𝐗 𝑛 
ncludes construction cost indices i.e., changes in labor and material
osts defined for the main national construction markets, the intensity
f historical development as measured by development density in 1980
nd terrain ruggedness. According to Hilber and Robert-Nicoud (2013) ,
he historic level of housing development proxies for the fact that high-
menity areas develop first and tend to adopt more stringent land-use
egulations over time. Controlling for terrain ruggedness takes into ac-
ount that plots of land featuring geographic characteristics favorable
o development such as flat and non-rocky surfaces are likely developed
efore those showing adverse geographic characteristics. Therefore, we
xpect unfavorable geographic features to increase rents and prices over
ime, as developers face higher construction costs for providing addi-
ional housing units on the extensive margin of existing development.
imilarly, we control for the elevation of the land. We further control for
he distance to the nearest central business districts to capture potential17 Note that all our results are robust to allowing for region-specific valuations 
f housing attributes, i.e., the inclusion of 𝛽𝑟𝑡 where regions 𝑟 are defined as 
antons or commuting zones containing a sufficient number of locations 𝑛 . 
18 In equilibrium 𝑄 𝑑 
𝑛 
= 𝑄 𝑠 
𝑛 
= 𝑄 𝑛 holds, such that we omit supply and demand 
uperscripts in what follows. 
19 Note that such controls might also partial out quality differences not fully 







5 ime trend differentials in the labor supply (and demand) across space.
hese variables might also capture changes in transportation costs. 20 
Despite controlling for several supply shifters, omitted variables
nd reverse causality may still bias the estimation of Eq. (8) . To
olve this issue, we propose an instrumental variable approach that
ims to exclusively shift housing demand while leaving housing sup-
ly unchanged. Specifically, we require an instrument, denoted Δ ln 𝑍 𝑛 ,
hich is relevant for housing demand changes while remaining exoge-
ous to supply changes conditional on the set of controls in 𝐗 𝑛 , i.e.,
(Δ ln 𝑍 𝑛 Δ ln 𝑆 𝑃 𝑛 |𝐗 𝑛 ) = 0 . 
As apparent from Eq. (9) , we cannot use observed changes in the
omponents of the housing demand, as in equilibrium they are affected
y tension forces between housing demand and supply. Following the re-
ent work by Baum-Snow and Han, 2021 , we isolate exogenous changes
n labor demand given the spatial linkages (commuting cost) of a neigh-
orhood with employment centers. We define 
ln 𝑍 𝑛 = 
∑
𝑖,𝑘 
𝟏 ( 𝑚 𝑛𝑖𝑡 0 < 1 hour ) 
𝑚 𝑛𝑖𝑡 0 
𝑓 𝑘 
𝑛𝑡 0 
Δ ln 𝐹 𝑘 
𝐶( 𝑛 ) , (10) 
here the indicator function 𝟏 ( 𝑚 𝑛𝑖𝑡 0 < 1 hour ) equals one for neighbor-
oods 𝑖 that are located at most at 60 minutes travel time from neigh-
orhood 𝑛 , and zero otherwise. 21 The quantity 𝑓 𝑘 
𝑛𝑡 0 
represents the share
f employment belonging to sector 𝑘 in neighborhood 𝑛 at time 𝑡 0 . The
erm Δ ln 𝐹 𝑘 
𝐶( 𝑛 ) is the corresponding aggregate growth rate of employ-
ent in industry 𝑘 over [ 𝑡, 𝑡 0 ] in region 𝐶 in which neighborhood 𝑛 is
ocated. 22 
The intuition behind Eq. (10) is straightforward. We compute a
eighted employment growth of the predetermined sectoral composi-
ion in the proximity of a given neighborhood by imposing a common
ndustry growth equal to the one that occurred in the region 𝐶 in which
he neighborhood is located. Taking into account the proximity in terms
f commuting time to other neighborhoods is of particular relevance in
he case of small spatial units, e.g., neighborhoods, as most individuals
ikely do not work in the same neighborhood where they live. We use
 one-hour radius for the maximum commuting distance in the bench-
ark analysis, as this leads to the strongest predictive power of the in-
trument. 
Two features in the way we compute Δ ln 𝑍 𝑛 support exogeneity
laims with respect to unobserved supply dynamics. First, in line with
artik (1991), we exclude neighborhood 𝑛 itself from the computation
f Δ ln 𝐹 𝑘 
𝐶( 𝑛 ) . Second, we exclude all sectors related to construction and
eal estate from 𝑓 𝑘 
𝑛𝑡 0 
and Δ ln 𝐹 𝑘 
𝐶( 𝑛 ) . Therefore, the instrument captures
eighted changes in labor demand that are not related to the construc-
ion sector. 
The instrument defined by Eq. (10) is a shift-share instrument in line
ith Bartik (1991) . 23 Recently, Adão et al., 2019 , Borusyak et al., 2021 ,
nd Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2020 investigated the econometric as-
umptions necessary for the validity of shift-share instruments. These
nstruments are valid if either initial shares are independent and ran-
omly assigned across observations or growth shocks occur randomly
cross regions. In our setting, we argue that initial sectoral shares are
xogenous with respect to changes in unobserved supply shifters and lo-
al rent and price dynamics. The sectoral distribution of employment is
ighly persistent and largely determined by natural amenities and mar-
et access, such that the historic sectoral distribution is unlikely to beOf course, these control variables also affect housing demand. In this case, 
ncluding them in the supply function is even more important as they reduce 
ndogeneity issues arising from changes in housing demand according to Eq. (9) . 
21 We set travel time within the same municipality to 1 minute. 
22 In our baseline results, we use Cantons as aggregate region 𝐶, which repre- 
ent 26 upper-tier administrative units. Our results are robust using lower tier 
egions, such as districts (Bezirke). 
23 Graham and Makridis, 2021 introduce a related identification strategy com- 
ining variation in the initial distribution of housing characteristics together 
ith a national demand shift for these characteristics. 






































































































orrelated with recent changes of local housing supply shifters Δ ln 𝑆 𝑃 .
ollowing Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2020 , in Section 6 , we asses the va-
idity of the identifying variation by computing the Rotemberg weights
or each sector. 
We further support exogeneity claims regarding Δ ln 𝑍 𝑛 by compar-
ng our results with those obtained using an alternative shift-share in-
trument based on the distribution of language shares. 24 Specifically, for
ach neighborhood we compute the historical share of language shares
nd interact them with the cantonal growth of the respective language
roup. 25 Assuming that the idiosyncratic utility shifter can be decom-
osed as 𝐵 𝑘 
𝑛𝑖 
= 𝐵 𝑛 𝐵 𝑘 𝑖 in Eq. (5) , we can interpret this instrument as pre-
icting demand changes via a shift in the idiosyncratic preferences 𝐵 𝑛 
o live in a neighborhood 𝑛 . 
The no-arbitrage condition for investors purchasing real estate assets
revents that the demand shocks captured by our two instruments are
enure specific (see Section 2.2 ). Even if one of the demand shocks were
ore relevant to a specific part of the population that is more inclined
o rent or own, it would propagate across tenures due to changes in at-
ractiveness of investments. In the context of Switzerland, the close link
etween the rental and owner-occupied markets is reflected in a housing
arket that is approximately equally split between renters (56%) and
wner-occupiers (44%). The close link between different housing mar-
et segments is supported by recent work of Mense (2020) for Germany,
 country displaying similar housing market conditions as Switzerland.
pecifically, the author shows that the local construction of high-quality
ousing units lowers rents throughout the rent distribution shortly after
he new units are completed. 
The estimation of the supply elasticity with respect to rent changes
𝑄,𝑅 
𝑛 follows the same logic as before. By substituting the relationship
etween prices and rents arising from the parametrization of capitaliza-
ion rates into Eq. (8) , and isolating 𝑅 𝑛 , we obtain 
ln 𝑅 𝑛 = 𝛼𝑅 + 
1 
𝜖𝑄,𝑅 




𝜖𝑄,𝑃 𝜖𝑃 ,𝑅 
, and we assume that the vector 𝐗 𝑛 capturing the
bservable supply shifters discussed above is controlled for. The new




Δ ln 𝑆 𝑃 
𝑛 
. Because this new error term equals
he one of Eq. (8) times a constant structural parameter, the previous
iscussion of the identification assumptions still holds. 26 
We conclude this section by noting that average housing supply price
nd rent elasticity estimates can unambiguously be recovered from in-
erse supply equations (8) and (11) simply by taking the inverse of the




, respectively. 27 
Housing supply elasticity estimates allow us, in turn, to estimate elas-
icity parameters 𝜖𝑃 ,𝑅 and 𝜖𝑖,𝑅 . 28 
Estimating the inverse supply function, rather than the direct one, is
 common approach in the literature (e.g. Saiz, 2010 ) that offers several
dvantages. First, using as dependent variables quality-adjusted prices
nd rents resulting from a hedonic regression does not require additional24 Saiz (2007) uses a similar approach by computing a shift-share instrument 
ased on the number of immigrants moving into U.S. cities. 
25 See Online Appendix C for a formal definition of the instrument. 
26 The exogenous component of the capitalization rate 𝑖 0 is captured by the 
ent-specific constant 𝛼𝑅 in Eq. (11) . If we assume the parametrization of local 
apitalization rates exposed in Section 2 and allow for location-specific capital- 






Δ ln 𝑖 0 𝑛 . 
hus, the exogeneity of the instrument must also hold with respect to location- 
pecific exogenous capitalization rates. In Section 6 , we show that including 
everal controls proxying for Δ ln 𝑖 0 𝑛 does not affect our results. 
27 This relationship between inverse supply equations and housing supply elas- 
icity parameter estimates is purely mechanical and does not hinge on additional 
dentification assumptions. We obtain identical point estimates when estimating 
on-inverted supply equations. 
28 Assuming that the identification assumptions underlying the 2SLS estima- 
















6 tatistical treatment. This is not the case if quality-adjusted prices (and
ents) are used as regressors, as their standard errors are not valid and
eed to be bootstrapped. Second, instrumental variables tend to be more
elevant for quantity changes than for price ones, thereby improving the
recision of the estimates. Third, estimating inverse supply functions
llows us to instrument the same variable (i.e., Δ ln 𝑄 𝑛 ) to recover the
esponsiveness of housing supply to price and rent changes. This, in turn,
acilitates the comparison of the coefficients across specifications. 
.3. Local supply responsiveness and the role of geographic and regulatory 
onstraints 
Eqs. (8) and (11) assume that inverse supply elasticities with respect
o prices and rents are constant across locations. However, our concep-
ual framework suggests that housing supply elasticity varies at the local
evel, both at the intensive and extensive margin of residential develop-
ent. On the intensive margin, the empirical literature points out that
upply elasticity might vary considerably according to regulatory re-
trictions – such as height restriction, floor to area ratios, etc. – adopted
y local governments. According to Hilber and Robert-Nicoud (2013) ,
ttractive places are historically more developed and, as an outcome of
he political game between land developers and owners of developed
and, more regulated. On the extensive margin, Saiz (2010) points out
hat such constraints are empirically relevant only when there is enough
evelopment to make them binding. 29 To implement such considera-






≈ 𝛽𝑎𝑣𝑔,𝜏 + 𝛽ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡,𝜏 ×𝑄 1980 
𝑛 
+ 𝛽𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟,𝜏 × Λ𝑛 ×𝑄 1980 𝑛 , 𝜏 = 𝑅, 𝑃 , (12)
here the observed historic stock in 1980 𝑄 1980 
𝑛 
proxies for regulation
onstraints on the intensive margin, according to Hilber and Robert-
icoud (2013) . The variable Λ𝑛 is a measure summarizing the most im-
ortant geographic and regulatory constraints on the extensive margin.
nserting such approximation in Eqs. (8) and (11) , we then estimate the
ollowing equation 
ln ( 𝜏𝑛 ) = 𝛼𝜏 + 𝛽𝑎𝑣𝑔,𝜏Δln ( 𝑄 𝑛 ) + 𝛽ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡,𝜏Δln ( 𝑄 𝑛 ) ×𝑄 1980 𝑛 
+ 𝛽𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟,𝜏Δln ( 𝑄 𝑛 ) × Λ𝑛 ×𝑄 1980 𝑛 + Δ ln 𝑆 
𝜏
𝑛 
, 𝜏 = 𝑅, 𝑃 , (13) 




) as well as for the main effect of extensive margin constraints Λ𝑛 .
wo remarks are worth noting. First, Λ𝑛 is interacted with the historic
tock level 𝑄 1980 
𝑛 
, thus allowing the impact of regulatory constraints
o become more binding in more-developed places. Having estimated
he parameters 𝛽𝑎𝑣𝑔,𝜏 , 𝛽ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡,𝜏 , and 𝛽𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟,𝜏 , we then recover 𝜖𝑄,𝜏𝑛 using
q. (12) . Second, the identification assumptions of the price and rent
quation in Eq. (13) are the same as in Eqs. (8) and (11) provided 𝑄 1980 
𝑛 
nd Λ𝑛 are exogenous with respect to Δ ln 𝑆 𝜏 . 
. Data and descriptive statistics 
The empirical analysis relies on several data sources. Further infor-
ation is available in Online Appendix B. 
.1. Data sources 
Housing data We use geo-referenced data on advertised residential
roperties provided by Meta-Sys. The data set contains approximately
.1 million postings of rental properties and about 0.8 million postings
f selling residences for the whole of Switzerland from 2004 to 2016.
n addition to asking rents and prices, the data set includes compre-
ensive information on housing characteristics. The Federal Register29 For example, protected forest likely hinder residential development only if 
o other type of developable land is available in the neighborhood. 





























































Fig. 1. Rent, price, and stock dynamics Notes: Cities include 2x2 km neigh- 
borhoods located in one of the 15 main municipalities of the corresponding 
biggest urban areas according to 2015 boundaries. The two panels show index 
growth from 2005 to 2015 of the considered variables, using 2005 as the base 
year ( = 100). Stock is measured as the total number of dwellings, and rents and 
prices are measured as advertised average rents and prices per square meter. 





























33 Our data allows us to compile this measure at even finer scale than previous f Buildings and Habitations published by the Swiss Federal Statistical
ffice (FSO) provides a census of the residential housing stock of the
ountry. Changes in the housing stock are measured every five years,
roviding three time periods 2005, 2010, and 2015 that overlap with
ur advertisement data. Up to 2015, the register contains approximately
.8 million housing units for the whole of Switzerland, 11.5 percent of
hich were built between 2005 and 2015. The 2000 Building Census
published by the FSO) provides information on whether a dwelling is
 primary or secondary residence in that year. 
Socio-demographic and economic data We use the Federal Popu-
ation Census of 2000 (published by the FSO) as well as the Population
nd Households Survey from 2010 to 2015 (published by the FSO) to
nfer geo-referenced homeownership rates and to obtain information on
redetermined levels and changes in the local socio-demographic com-
osition i.e., nationality and language of residents living in a given area.
he 2000 Federal Population Census provides information on the type
f building owner, such as landlords and institutional investors. The
SO publishes a construction index tracking the cost evolution of mate-
ial and labor in the construction sector for seven statistical areas. We
btained detailed information about the spatial distribution of employ-
ent and firms by sector from the Structural Business Statistics (STA-
ENT). We use the NOGA 1 sector classification, which comprises 16
ifferent sectors in the case of Switzerland. 30 We combine this infor-
ation with data about road travel time provided by www.search.ch to
onstruct a local measure labor market access. 
Regulatory and geographic data The Land Use Statistics of Switzer-
and (published by the FSO) provides satellite-based land cover data,
llowing us to identify geographic constraints, such as lakes, rocks, and
laciers, and areas subject to particular regulations. Information about
egulations on the extensive margin and protected areas in particular
s obtained from Cantonal offices of spatial planning and the Federal
ffice for the Environment (FOEN). 
Other data We complement the above data with a variety of data
n Swiss administrative units and metropolitan areas (published by the
SO) and elevation (European Environment Agency). We identify the
gglomerations of the 15 main cities in Switzerland, as defined by the
SO, and compute the distance of each neighborhood to the closest city
enter. 
.2. Data structure and descriptive statistics 
We structure the data by partitioning the whole territory of the coun-
ry into small square neighborhoods of 2x2 km. We aggregate hous-
ng stock, socio-demographic and economic data, and geographic and
egulatory constraints within these neighborhoods. 31 We assign each
eighborhood to one of 2324 municipalities, which represent the low-
st governmental tier in Switzerland and have an influence on land use
egulation. 
From 2005 to 2015, rents have increased by approximately 14 per-
ent while prices have increased by approximately 35 percent at the
ountry level. 32 Over the same period, the housing stock grew by ap-
roximately 11 percent. Despite these general trends, stock, rent, and
rice dynamics are heterogeneous across space, as illustrated in Fig. 1 .
pecifically, Fig. 1 shows stock, rent, and price index growth in ma-
or cities (Panel A) and the countryside (Panel B) from 2005 to 2015,
sing 2005 as the base year ( = 100). Over the considered period, hous-
ng stock grew almost twice as much in the countryside areas than in
ities. This suggests that in cities a lack of developable land in conjunc-30 This classification corresponds to the major SIC industry groups in the U.S. 
31 Our results are robust to alternative neighborhood sizes, as discussed in 
ection 6 . 
32 For new tenancy agreements market rents apply in Switzerland. To prevent 
busive increases, property owners can adjust rents for existing tenancy agree- 
ents only if some formal criteria are met. However, several exceptions in the 








7 ion with geographic and regulatory constraints hinders further devel-
pment. Given this comparatively lower responsiveness of housing de-
elopment in cities, it is not surprising that rents and prices grew more
n these areas than in the countryside. Interestingly, from 2007 onward,
ents and price dynamics have started to diverge considerably - with
rices rising at a faster pace - which implies that capitalization rates
ave been revised downward in these locations. 
In Fig. 2 , we show the most important geographic and regulatory
onstraints for housing development in Switzerland. Geographic fea-
ures preventing any form of development are an important compo-
ent of the Swiss landscape. Similarly to Saiz (2010) and Lutz and
and (2019) , we define undevelopable land as land that is located above
000 m and whose land cover corresponds to unproductive vegeta-
ion, vegetation-free areas, or rocks, and glaciers. 33 Water bodies sig-
ificantly reduce the amount of developable land in the proximity of
ajor agglomerations, as virtually all major CBDs are adjacent to a lake
r river. 34 
In addition to geographic constraints, there are significant regula-
ory restrictions in place that prevent or hinder development in specific
reas. We refer to measures that prevent new construction on unde-
eloped land as regulations on the extensive margin. Regulations on the
xtensive margin include forests 35 , UNESCO cultural or natural heritage
ites, parks, and other high-value natural amenity areas. These restric-
ions account for approximately 49.1 percent of the Swiss territory. Total
estricted areas obtained by overlapping geographic and regulatory con-
traints at the extensive margin amount to approximately 67.3 percent
f the country’s surface. The remaining 32.7 percent of the country’s sur-
ace (white area in Fig. 2 ) is available for development under differentiterature. 
34 This is mainly due to the competitive advantage of areas in the proximity of 
ater bodies during the Industrial Revolution and the subsequent urbanization 
f Switzerland. 
35 In response to the growing industrialization of the country, in 1876, Switzer- 
and passed a federal law prohibiting further deforestation, de facto freezing 
orest areas to the level observed at that time. The law has remained mainly un- 
hanged to the present day. As a consequence, forest areas in highly populated 
egions have remained practically unchanged since 1876. 
S. Büchler, M.v. Ehrlich and O. Schöni Journal of Urban Economics 126 (2021) 103370 
Fig. 2. Constraints to development Notes: We define geographic constraints as undevelopable land , which corresponds to a plot of land located above 2000 m, or 
whose land use classification corresponds to unproductive vegetation, vegetation-free areas, or rocks and glaciers. Except for forests, red areas summarize regulatory 
constraints on the extensive margin. Swiss forests are protected areas since 1876. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is 
referred to the web version of this article.) 
Table 1 
Inverse housing supply elasticity – average estimates. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ΔLog P ΔLog R ΔLog P ΔLog R ΔLog P ΔLog R 
ΔLog Q 2.367 ∗∗∗ 0.694 ∗∗ 2.004 ∗∗∗ 0.747 ∗∗∗ 2.084 ∗∗∗ 0.735 ∗∗∗ 
(0.442) (0.287) (0.342) (0.215) (0.316) (0.191) 
Amplification 𝜖𝑃 ,𝑅 3.411 2.683 2.835 
Instruments I I L L I & L I & L 
Observations 2,498 2,498 2,498 2,498 2,498 2,498 
Kleibergen-Paap F 15.61 15.61 71.39 71.39 42.76 42.76 
Overidentification - - - - 0.40 0.87 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses ∗ 𝑝 < . 10 , ∗∗ 𝑝 < . 05 , ∗∗∗ 𝑝 < . 01 . Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. The sample covers the period 2005–2015. 
The Adão et al., 2019 standard errors for columns (1), (2), (3), and (4) are 0.100, 0.048, 0.386, and 0.198, respectively. The units of observations are obtained 
by partitioning Switzerland in 2x2 km neighborhoods. Log rents and log prices are quality-adjusted with respect to the living surface, the number of rooms, age, 
age squared, and building type. All regressions control for supply shifters, which include elevation, elevation standard deviation, log-distance to the nearest CBD, 
log-housing stock in 1980, total restricted areas, and change (2005–2015) in construction costs. See Online Appendix E for detailed estimation results and first stages. 
Changes in housing stock ΔLog Q , are instrumented using a shift-share instrument for industries I in columns (1) and (2), a shift-share instrument for main spoken 





















t  egulatory measures determining the intensity and type of residential
evelopment. 
. Results 
.1. Supply elasticity estimates and amplification mechanism 
Table 1 summarizes average supply elasticity estimates with respect
o price (columns 1, 3, and 5) and rent (columns 2, 4, and 6) changes, re-
pectively. Columns 1 and 2 report estimates based on the shift-share in-
trument Δ ln 𝑍 𝑛 derived from historic industry shares (used as a bench-
ark). Columns 3 and 4 report the corresponding effects for the shift-8 hare instrument derived from historic language shares. Columns 5 and
 show the results when using the two instruments simultaneously. Since
ur model framework in Section 2 establishes labor market shocks as a
ource of shifts in housing demand, we refer to the results based on
ndustry shares as our baseline estimates. 
Responsiveness estimates based on the industry instrument are equal
o 𝜖𝑄,𝑅 = 1 0 . 694 = 1 . 44 for rent and 𝜖
𝑄,𝑃 = 1 2 . 367 = 0 . 42 for price changes.
hese results show that, on average, the housing supply in Switzer-
and is relatively elastic to rent changes, but less so to price changes.
he corresponding amplification effect is 𝜖𝑃 ,𝑅 = 𝜖
𝑄,𝑅 
𝜖𝑄,𝑃 
= 3 . 43 . The coun-
ry’s average response of local capitalization rates to rent changes is
hus 𝜖𝑖,𝑅 = 1 − 𝜖𝑃 ,𝑅 = −2 . 43 , suggesting that investors revise local rent
S. Büchler, M.v. Ehrlich and O. Schöni Journal of Urban Economics 126 (2021) 103370 
Table 2 
Inverse housing supply elasticity – local estimates. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ΔLog P ΔLog R ΔLog P ΔLog R ΔLog P ΔLog R 
ΔLog Q 1.001 ∗∗ 0.095 1.578 ∗∗∗ 0.519 ∗∗∗ 1.307 ∗∗∗ 0.321 ∗ 
(0.411) (0.218) (0.305) (0.197) (0.306) (0.176) 
0.690 ∗∗∗ 0.302 ∗∗∗ 0.842 ∗∗∗ 0.446 ∗∗∗ 0.678 ∗∗∗ 0.319 ∗∗∗ 
(0.189) (0.089) (0.200) (0.109) (0.151) (0.082) 
Λ ×𝑄 1980 × ΔLog Q 0.241 ∗∗ 0.122 ∗∗ 0.330 ∗∗∗ 0.192 ∗∗∗ 0.255 ∗∗∗ 0.134 ∗∗∗ 
(0.110) (0.049) (0.115) (0.059) (0.099) (0.048) 
Instruments I I L L I & L I & L 
Observations 2,498 2,498 2,498 2,498 2,498 2,498 
Kleibergen-Paap F 12.98 12.98 23.48 23.48 19.46 19.46 
Overidentification - - - - 0.56 0.49 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses ∗ 𝑝 < . 10 , ∗∗ 𝑝 < . 05 , ∗∗∗ 𝑝 < . 01 . Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. The sample covers the period 2005–2015. 
The units of observations are obtained by partitioning Switzerland in 2x2 km neighborhoods. Log rents and log prices are quality-adjusted with respect to the living 
surface, the number of rooms, age, age squared, and building type. All regressions control for supply shifters, which include elevation, elevation standard deviation, 
log-distance to the nearest CBD, log-housing stock in 1980, total restricted areas, and change in construction costs from 2005 to 2015. Total restricted area ( Λ) 
is standardized and contains constraints on the extensive margin water bodies, undevelopable land, forest, and other protected areas. See Online Appendix E for 
detailed estimation results and first stages. Changes in housing stock ΔLog Q including interaction terms thereof are instrumented using a shift-share instrument for 


































































38 Note that the heterogeneity arising from geographic and regulatory con- 
straints alone is never significant. To compute our estimates, we always include 
geographic/regulatory constraints as a control, thus partialling out a direct ef- 
fect of this variable on rent and price dynamics. For the detailed results, see rowth expectations (risk premium) upward (downward) following an
xogenous positive demand shock. 36 These results remain mostly un-
hanged when using the instrument derived from historic language
hares ( 𝜖𝑃 ,𝑅 = 2 . 68 ) and when employing both instruments simultane-
usly ( 𝜖𝑃 ,𝑅 = 2 . 84 ). 
Reassuringly, the above results support our exogeneity claims about
he instruments. This is for two reasons. First, despite having the ex-
ected positive impact on Δ ln 𝑄 , the two instruments capture different
ariations while leading to very similar estimates. 37 In this case, it seems
nlikely that if one or both instruments were endogenous, they would
onverge toward similar estimates. Second, the overidentification tests
eported at the bottom of columns 5 and 6 do not point toward endo-
eneity issues. In Section 6 , we further investigate the exogeneity of the
nstrument with respect to the inclusion of potential confounders. 
.2. Housing supply and amplification heterogeneity 
We now turn to the analysis of housing supply heterogeneity at the
ocal level. Table 2 summarizes the results when all relevant constraints
n the extensive margin - including water bodies, undevelopable land,
orest, and other protected areas - are considered together in the total
estricted area Λ𝑛 . We follow the same structure as in Table 1 and re-
ort the results using the instruments based on industry shares (columns
 and 2), language shares (columns 3 and 4), and the two instruments
imultaneously (columns 5 and 6). In addition to the extensive mar-
in restrictions, we account for the historic level of building develop-
ent 𝑄 1980 
𝑛 
, thus allowing the impact of regulatory constraints to be-
ome more binding in more-developed places. 
The coefficients of the double and triple interaction terms, which
apture local supply heterogeneity, are all highly significant for rental
nd selling properties. These estimates suggest that i) historically devel-
ped places have more inelastic housing markets both with respect to
ent and price changes, and ii) geographic and regulatory constraints on36 These spatial results are in line with recent findings investigating aggregate 
ime dynamics. By simulating a dynamic model, Begley et al. (2019) find that 
 positive demand shock – as captured by higher population growth – leads to 
ower capitalization rates. It also aligns with the findings of Kaplan et al. (2020) , 
ho finds that a change in expectations drives the dynamics of price-rent ratios. 
37 See first-stage results reported in Online Appendix E. The coefficients for the 








9 he extensive margin are more binding in more-developed places. 38 Rel-
tive to the main effect, Δ log 𝑄 , the double interaction coefficients are
ystematically lower for selling than for rental properties. This implies
hat previous development patterns decrease the average supply elastic-
ty of rental properties to a larger extent than that of selling properties.
Having estimated the coefficients 𝛽𝑎𝑣𝑔,𝜏 , 𝛽ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡,𝜏 , and 𝛽𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟,𝜏 for rental
nd selling properties, we compute supply elasticities coefficients at the
eighborhood level according to Eq. (12) . To facilitate the visual rep-
esentation of these parameters, we aggregate these local supply elas-
icities at the municipality level by using the mean values. In Fig. 3 we
how the spatial distribution of local housing supply price elasticity 𝜖𝑄,𝑃 𝑛 
Panel A) and of the corresponding amplification coefficient 𝜖𝑖,𝑅 𝑛 (Panel
). 39 
As apparent from Fig. 3 (Panel A), housing supply price elasticity
aries considerably across space. Major agglomerations - and even more
o areas near major CBDs – are particularly inelastic, with the munici-
ality of Zurich and its neighboring agglomerations accounting for the
argest area displaying inelastic housing supply. 40 In contrast, country-
ide areas generally display comparatively higher elasticity values. How-
ver, this is not always true for alpine regions. Some alpine regions, es-
ecially touristic ones, have low price elasticity values, likely due to the
mportance of geographic constraints in conjunction with high levels of
istorical development. 41 
Compared to the housing supply elasticities estimated by
aiz (2010) for the major U.S. metropolitan areas, the supply side
f the Swiss housing market is significantly less elastic to price changes.
his is not surprising as Gyourko and Molloy (2015) point out that
mong OECD countries, the U.S. is among the countries displayingnline Appendix E. 
39 We do not report the spatial distribution of 𝜖𝑄,𝑅 
𝑛 





40 The distribution of both rent and price elasticities is skewed to the left. Av- 
rage supply elasticities at a given aggregation level are thus affected by a few 
xtremely inelastic places. In Table D.1 in Online Appendix D.1, we rank the re- 
ponsiveness of housing markets at three different aggregation levels: cantons, 
gglomerations, and municipalities. 
41 The municipalities of Zermatt (VS) and St. Moritz (GR), both famous ski 
esorts, count among the 10 percent most-inelastic Swiss municipalities. 















Fig. 3. Local housing supply elasticities and amplification coefficient Notes: Supply elasticity interval defined according to quintiles of the distribution. Local 
estimates are computed using Eq. (13) for 2km side country grid data. Heterogeneity is due to the sum of relevant geographic and regulatory constraints on the 
extensive margin and due to the historic housing stock. Elasticities for cells in which transactions occurred only in 2005 or 2015 – which are thus not included in 
Eq. (13) due to first differencing – are imputed according to their value of geographic and regulatory constraints. No data corresponds to municipalities whose area 




































































b  he most elastic housing supply. The unresponsiveness in Switzerland
an be explained by the intensive and extensive margin constraints
o development. On the intensive margin, housing development in
witzerland is constrained to low density. Even major cities, such as
urich and Geneva, high-rise buildings (i.e., buildings counting more
han seven stories) are the exception rather than the rule. On the
xtensive margin, widespread geographic and regulatory constraints
inder new development even in the countryside. 42 
As shown in Fig. 3 (Panel B), the amplification mechanism displays
onsiderable spatial heterogeneity, with values ranging from 2.68 to
0.57. These results suggest that central places display the lowest value
f 𝜖𝑃 ,𝑅 𝑛 , whereas countryside areas the highest. Following a shock to
he periodic rental income, investors thus revise their expectations and
isk premia more in remote areas than in central ones. This heteroge-
eous adaptation across space might be explained by the fact that at-
ractive, and typically heavily restricted and regulated, central places
lready command high rent growth expectations and low risk premia.
n such places, a positive demand shock is unlikely to modify investors’
xpectations strongly. On the contrary, it is more likely that investors
evise their expectations substantially following a demand shock in elas-
ic countryside areas where previous demand has been scarce. This is in
ine with the hypothesis of a path-dependent view of spatial develop-
ent. Investors myopically anticipate that places having experienced
ow (high) demand in the past will continue to do so in the future, thus
not) updating their beliefs when such places are indeed subject to a
ositive demand shock. 
To investigate the role played by specific supply constraints in de-
ermining the breadth of heterogeneity of local supply responses, we
stimate Eqs. (8) and (11) by including interactions between Δ𝑄 𝑛 and
pecific supply constraints. We then compute average supply elasticities
hen the considered constraints are set to their 25th and 75th percentile
alue of the distribution of these constraints across all neighborhoods of
he country. We classify supply constraints into three main categories.
eographic constraints, which arise from natural features of the land-42 In Online Appendix D.2, we provide a more detailed comparison of our es- 





10 cape, are proxied by the share of undevelopable land, i.e., water bodies
r rocky areas. Regulatory constraints on the extensive margin, which
epresent barriers to development on new plots of land, are given by
rotected areas, i.e. forests, cultural or natural heritage sites, and areas
xclusively reserved for agriculture purposes according to federal law. 43 
inally, regulatory constraints on the intensive margin, which capture
ny other regulation, are proxied by the level of the housing stock in
980. 
Table 3 shows the results. We observe that places with a low share
f undevelopable land (25th percentile) display a supply elasticity for
ent changes of 0.61, whereas those at the upper end (75th percentile)
isplay a 2 . 8% lower supply elasticity of 0.59. In the case of price elas-
icities, this heterogeneity is more pronounced. Places with a relatively
igh share of undevelopable land display a 5 . 7% lower price elasticity of
ousing supply than those with a low share of undevelopable land. We
nterpret the results when considering extensive and intensive margin
egulatory constraints analogously. The most pronounced inter-quartile
eterogeneity is observed when geographic and extensive margin reg-
latory constraints are considered together, as supply elasticity differ-
nces amount to 16 . 6% for rents and 34 . 6% for prices. 
.3. Investors’ sophistication and the revision of local expectations 
Our explanation for observed spatial differences in the revision of in-
estors’ expectations is that investors differ in their ability to anticipate
emand shocks. To empirically test this proposition, let us assume that
ome investors are more sophisticated than others. In particular, more
ophisticated investors have access to a better information set, which
llows them to predict future demand growth more precisely. Given
hese assumptions, we expect that in places where more sophisticated
nvestors buy properties, the amplification mechanism (capitalization
ate update) is lower (less negative). 
We proxy the presence of sophisticated investors in a given neigh-
orhood with the share of landlords, institutional investors, and second-
ome buyers. The 2000 Federal Population Census contains detailed in-43 Given that the nature of the considered geographic constraints is similar to 
he one of extensive margin regulation, we analyze the latter in conjunction 
ith the former. 
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Table 3 
Contributions of geographic and regulatory constraints to supply heterogeneity. 
25th 75th % change 25th 75th % change 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Rents Prices 
Geographic constraints: Undevelopable 0.61 0.59 -2.80 ∗ ∗ ∗ 2.63 2.48 -5.70 ∗ ∗ 
Total geographic & regulatory extensive margin constraints: Total restricted 1.67 0.56 -16.60 ∗ ∗ ∗ 3.53 2.31 -34.56 ∗ ∗ 
Regulatory constraints - intensive margin: Stock 1980 0.69 0.58 -15.40 ∗ ∗ ∗ 3.21 2.40 -25.10 ∗ ∗ ∗ 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses ∗ 𝑝 < . 10 , ∗∗ 𝑝 < . 05 , ∗∗∗ 𝑝 < . 01 . Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. Columns (1) and (4) show the 25th 
quintiles of elasticities. Columns (2) and (5) show the 75th quintiles of elasticities. The units of observations are obtained by partitioning Switzerland in 2x2 km 
neighborhoods. Note that the historic stock serves as a proxy for the intensity of regulation. Total restricted includes all geographic constraints and all regulatory 
constraints on the extensive margin. 
Table 4 
Investors’ sophistication and expectations. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Amplification effect 
Share of landlords -6.178 ∗∗∗ -4.408 ∗∗∗ 
(0.328) (0.342) 
Share of institutional investors -11.046 ∗∗∗ -13.830 ∗∗∗ 
(1.292) (1.376) 
Share of 2nd homes -5.620 ∗∗∗ -5.292 ∗∗∗ 
(0.717) (0.410) 
Observations 1,851 3,829 1,851 3,733 1,851 3,829 
R-squared 0.24 0.17 0.27 0.26 0.14 0.18 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses ∗ 𝑝 < . 10 , ∗∗ 𝑝 < . 05 , ∗∗∗ 𝑝 < . 01 . Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. The units of observations are obtained 
by partitioning Switzerland in 2x2 km neighborhoods. Controls include elevation, elevation standard deviation, log-distance to the nearest CBD, city dummy, total 
























































e  ormation on the type of owner of a building. The label ‘institutional
nvestors’ encompasses large firms investing in real estate, such as pen-
ion funds, banks, and insurance companies. Therefore, institutional in-
estors include owners that do not live in the neighborhood or that, at the
ery least, do not consume residential housing in that location. By mea-
uring the local presence of landlords and institutional investors, we can
bstract from idiosyncratic consumption preferences related to residen-
ial housing that might drive purchasing decisions of owner-occupiers.
n the case of second-home buyers, Bernstein et al. (2019) have docu-
ented that these type of buyers tends to exhibit fewer biases in their
nvestment decisions. 
We estimate the following cross-sectional relationship 
𝑃 ,𝑅 
𝑛 
= 𝛼 + 𝛽𝜔 𝑛 + 𝚯𝑛 𝛾 + 𝜐𝑛 , (14)
here 𝜖𝑃 ,𝑅 𝑛 represents the amplification coefficient in neighborhood 𝑛
computed relying on the industry share instrument), and 𝜔 𝑛 is the
redetermined share of either landlords, institutional investors, or sec-
nd homeowners in 2000. As in Table 2 , The vector 𝚯𝑛 contains time-
nvariant controls such as elevation, elevation standard deviation, log-
istance to the nearest CBD, construction costs, log-housing stock in
980, total restricted areas, and change (2005–2015) in construction
osts. The variable 𝜐𝑛 is a stochastic error term. 
Table 4 shows the estimation results. In columns 1, 3, and 5, we re-
ort results based on the same sample as in Table 2 , whereas in columns
, 4 and, 6, we perform out-of-sample predictions based on the elastic-
ty estimates of Table 2 . 44 We perform such out-of-sample predictions to
nclude a larger number of neighborhoods containing shares of sophis-
icated investors, which provides a greater variation in the observed
nvestor types that we can exploit empirically. 44 More precisely, we use the estimates of 𝛽𝑎𝑣𝑔,𝜏 , 𝛽ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡,𝜏 , and 𝛽𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟,𝜏 reported in 
able 2 together with observed values of 𝑄 1980 
𝑛 
and Λ𝑛 to predict local housing 
upply elasticities according to Eq. (12) in places where there was not a sufficient 




11 The results in Table 4 shows that a higher share of landlords, insti-
utional investors, and second homes is indeed associated with a lower
mplification effect. The relationship between the amplification effect
nd landlords, institutional investors, and second-home investors is ro-
ust across samples. The effect of the share of institutional investors
s bigger in magnitude than the ones for landlords and second-home in-
estors, which suggests that the former anticipate future demand shocks
t least as good or better than landlords and second-home investors.
his seems reasonable, given that institutional investors are professional
uyers investing in real estate, mainly to realize capital gains or bene-
t from rental income, and typically devote considerable resources to
onduct market studies to optimize their investment strategies. Over-
ll, our results point to heterogeneous expectation adjustment similar
o Makridis (2020) . 45 
. Robustness checks 
.1. Modifiable areal unit problem 
One may question the stability of our results for different definitions
r areal units. More specifically, according to Briant et al. (2010) , our
oint estimates of (inverse) supply elasticities in Table 1 might vary
epending on the aggregation level. We thus verify the robustness of
ur estimates by both decreasing (down to 1 km) and increasing (up to
 km) the sides of square the neighborhoods. Additionally, because they
epresent the lowest-tier political units in Switzerland, we estimate our
pecifications also at the municipality level. 
Panels A to C of Table 5 illustrate the results. As before, we report
stimates based on the industry instrument (columns 1 and 2), language45 While our framework exclusively focuses on real estate markets, 
akridis (2020) relates changes of homeowners’ expectations about the cur- 
ent and future state of the national economy to property capital gains realized 
t the local level. 
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Table 5 
Robustness – local market size. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ΔLog P ΔLog R ΔLog P ΔLog R ΔLog P ΔLog R 
Panel A: 1km 
ΔLog Q 4.742 ∗∗ 2.263 2.779 ∗∗∗ 0.902 ∗∗∗ 2.855 ∗∗∗ 0.955 ∗∗∗ 
(2.411) (1.788) (0.618) (0.282) (0.614) (0.290) 
Observations 3,958 3,958 3,958 3,958 3,958 3,958 
Kleibergen-Paap F 1.23 1.23 23.21 23.21 12.15 12.15 
Overidentification - - - - 0.22 0.30 
Panel B: 3km 
ΔLog Q 2.359 ∗∗∗ 0.996 ∗∗∗ 1.940 ∗∗∗ 0.655 ∗∗∗ 2.027 ∗∗∗ 0.725 ∗∗∗ 
(0.529) (0.376) (0.287) (0.200) (0.284) (0.188) 
Observations 1,667 1,667 1,667 1,667 1,667 1,667 
Kleibergen-Paap F 11.56 11.56 93.89 93.89 52.80 52.80 
Overidentification - - - - 0.36 0.34 
Panel C: Municipalities 
ΔLog Q 1.902 ∗∗∗ 0.395 ∗∗ 1.992 ∗∗∗ 0.498 ∗∗ 1.959 ∗∗∗ 0.460 ∗∗∗ 
(0.297) (0.193) (0.257) (0.204) (0.241) (0.173) 
Observations 1,673 1,673 1,673 1,673 1,673 1,673 
Kleibergen-Paap F 86.93 86.93 118.89 118.89 75.63 75.63 
Overidentification - - - - 0.74 0.62 
Panel D: 20 ads 
ΔLog Q 2.082 ∗∗∗ 0.594 ∗∗ 2.255 ∗∗∗ 1.127 ∗∗∗ 2.215 ∗∗∗ 1.004 ∗∗∗ 
(0.579) (0.283) (0.463) (0.282) (0.408) (0.242) 
Observations 1,304 1,304 1,304 1,304 1,304 1,304 
Kleibergen-Paap F 21.46 21.46 36.50 36.50 24.69 24.69 
Overidentification - - - - 0.80 0.15 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses ∗ 𝑝 < . 10 , ∗∗ 𝑝 < . 05 , ∗∗∗ 𝑝 < . 01 . Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. The sample covers the period 2005–
2015. For Panels A, B, and, D the units of observations are obtained by partitioning Switzerland in 1x1, 3x3, and 2x2 km neighborhoods, respectively. The units of 
observations for Panel C are the Swiss municipalities. For Panel D we restrict the sample to units that have at least 20 selling and rental advertisements. All regressions 
control for supply shifters, which include elevation, elevation standard deviation, log-distance to the nearest CBD, log-housing stock in 1980, total restricted areas, 
and change (2005–2015) in construction costs. Changes in housing stock ΔLog Q , are instrumented using a shift-share instrument for industries I in columns (1) and 

















































46 Sivitanidou and Sivitanides (1999) and Chen et al. (2004) document that 
vacancy rates and unemployment can affect local capitalization rates. nstrument in (columns 3 and 4), and both instruments simultaneously
columns 5 and 6). The average supply elasticity estimates for rents and
rices are stable for 1 km, 3 km side cells, as well as at the municipality
evel. The magnitude of the elasticities increases somewhat for the 1 km
ide neighborhoods while they decrease somewhat at the municipal-
ty level. Importantly, for all levels of aggregation, we find evidence of
tronger supply response to rent than price changes, with amplification
oefficients stable across specifications and similar to those of Table 1 . 
.2. Frequency of rent and price observations 
We investigate whether grid-cells containing a small number of
ental and selling properties, typically located remote areas, are driv-
ng our main results. In Panel D of Table 5 , we thus report estimation
esults when restricting the sample of our main analysis to 2x2km grid
ells containing at least 20 observations for both rental and selling prop-
rties. The estimated coefficients remain almost identical to those in the
enchmark Table 1 . 
.3. Local risk 
A further concern might be that local factors influence the fundamen-
al capitalization rate 𝑖 0 introduced above. In this case, local changes
𝑖 0 𝑛 are captured by the error term in Eq. (11) , and, if correlated with
he instrument, they might bias our results. Even though there are no
bvious factors that determine local fundamental capitalization rates
hat correlate with initial industry shares, we may analyze this concern
y controlling for potential local determinants of Δ ln 𝑖 0 𝑛 . This includes,
ost likely, factors describing local risk perceptions of investors. 12 Panels A and B of Table 6 report estimation results when we proxy
ocal risk by using local vacancy rates ( 𝑉 𝑅 , columns 1 and 2 of Panel
), local time on the market of advertised rental units ( 𝑇 𝑂𝑀𝑅 , columns
 and 4 of Panel A) and selling units ( 𝑇 𝑂𝑀𝑃 , columns 5 and 6 of Panel
), and local unemployment rates (Unem, columns 5 and 6 of Panel B).
Vacancy rates and unemployment rates proxy for the uncertainty as-
ociated with the rental income of a property located in a given area,
hereas time on market captures its liquidity. 46 Note that here we con-
rol for the initial levels and not contemporary changes of these variable
ince the latter would represent mediator i.e., endogenous variables. As
s evident from Table 6 , we can confirm significantly higher responsive-
ess of housing supply to rent changes than to price changes when we
ndividually control for the above variables. The corresponding ampli-
cation effects are very similar to those of our benchmark results. 
.4. Local variation in the type of housing units 
As discussed in Section 3.1 , we partial out differences in the at-
ributes of renting and selling units across regions. However, one might
orry that the observed housing characteristics that we use for adjust-
ng quality differences might not fully capture dissimilarities between
ental and selling properties. Note that this problem only matters to the
xtent that unobserved quality differences correlate with our benchmark
nstrument based on industrial composition, which seems unlikely. Nev-
rtheless, we address this potential concern by controlling for i) the pre-
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Table 6 
Robustness - confounders. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ΔLog P ΔLog R ΔLog P ΔLog R ΔLog P ΔLog R 
Panel A: Confounders 1 
ΔLog P ΔLog R ΔLog P ΔLog R ΔLog P ΔLog R 
ΔLog Q 2.116 ∗∗∗ 0.909 ∗∗ 2.366 ∗∗∗ 0.695 ∗∗ 2.503 ∗∗∗ 0.697 ∗∗ 
(0.493) (0.355) (0.440) (0.289) (0.463) (0.295) 
Confounder VR TOMR TOMP 
Observations 2,158 2,158 2,498 2,498 2,498 2,498 
Kleibergen-Paap F 11.08 11.08 15.52 15.52 15.52 15.52 
Panel B: Confounders 2 
ΔLog Q 2.429 ∗∗∗ 0.641 ∗∗ 1.963 ∗∗∗ 0.582 ∗∗ 2.236 ∗∗∗ 0.636 ∗∗ 
(0.454) (0.289) (0.379) (0.275) (0.417) (0.280) 
Confounder Unem GOwn Own00 
Observations 2,498 2,498 2,498 2,498 2,467 2,467 
Kleibergen-Paap F 14.67 14.67 16.89 16.89 16.10 16.10 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses ∗ 𝑝 < . 10 , ∗∗ 𝑝 < . 05 , ∗∗∗ 𝑝 < . 01 . Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. The sample covers the period 2005–2015. 
The units of observations are obtained by partitioning Switzerland in 2x2 km neighborhoods. All regressions control for supply shifters. Supply shifters include 
elevation, elevation standard deviation, log-distance to the nearest CBD, log-housing stock in 1980, total restricted areas, and change (2005–2015) in construction 
costs. Changes in housing stock ΔLog Q , are instrumented using a shift-share instrument for industries I in all columns. Panel A columns (1) and (2) control for the 
vacancy rate in 2000 VR, columns (3) and (4) control for the time on market for rental properties TOMR, and columns (5) and (6) control for the time on market 
for selling properties TOMP. Panel B columns (1) and (2) control for the ownership rate in 2000 Own00, columns (3) and (4) control for the growth in ownership 
(2005–2015) GOwn, and columns (5) and (6) control for the share of unemployment in 2000 Unem. 
Table 7 
Inverse housing supply elasticity – shorter term estimates. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ΔLog P ΔLog R ΔLog P ΔLog R ΔLog P ΔLog R 
ΔLog Q 2.697 ∗∗∗ 0.590 ∗∗ 2.222 ∗∗∗ 0.477 ∗∗ 2.367 ∗∗∗ 0.514 ∗∗ 
(0.418) (0.287) (0.381) (0.232) (0.341) (0.204) 
ΔLog Q ×𝐷 10−−15 -0.226 0.102 -0.127 0.575 ∗∗ -0.140 0.453 ∗∗ 
(0.345) (0.273) (0.306) (0.227) (0.288) (0.218) 
Instruments I I L L I & L I & L 
Observations 4,836 4,836 4,836 4,836 4,836 4,836 
Kleibergen-Paap F 14.69 14.69 37.08 37.08 26.78 26.78 
Overidentification – – – – 0.54 0.11 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses ∗ 𝑝 < . 10 , ∗∗ 𝑝 < . 05 , ∗∗∗ 𝑝 < . 01 . Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. The sample covers the period 2005–2015. 
The units of observations are obtained by partitioning Switzerland in 2x2 km neighborhoods. Log rents and log prices are quality-adjusted with respect to the living 
surface, the number of rooms, age, age squared, and building type. All regressions control for supply shifters, which include elevation, elevation standard deviation, 
log-distance to the nearest CBD, log-housing stock in 1980, and change in construction costs from 2005 to 2010 and from 2010 to 2015. Changes in housing stock 
ΔLog Q including interaction terms thereof are instrumented using a shift-share instrument for industries I in columns (1) and (2), a shift-share instrument for main 


































47 These weights are based on Rotemberg (1983) and Andrews et al., 2017 . etermined level of homeownership rates in 2000 ( 𝑂𝑤𝑛 00 ), and ii) the
hange in ownership rates between 2005 and 2015 ( 𝐺 𝑂 𝑤𝑛 ). Controlling
or these two variables allows us to take explicitly into account varia-
ions in the composition of housing goods across neighborhoods. Panel
 of Table 6 documents that the results remain mostly unchanged. 
.5. Rotemberg weights 
The identification of both our shift-share instruments (industry and
anguage) comes from the initial shares. More precisely, we assume that
nitial shares of industries and languages measure the differential ex-
genous exposure to a corresponding global shock (growth in industries
nd languages at the cantonal level). Since the predetermined shares
re equilibrium outcomes that are affected by price and rent levels, they
robably correlate with the price and rent levels in that period . However,
he validity of the instrument hinges on the assumption that the initial
hares are exogenous to changes in prices and rents, not to the initial
evels. 13 To test this assumption in our framework, we follow Goldsmith-
inkham et al., 2020 and compute the Rotemberg weights for the dif-
erent industries and languages. 47 These weights indicate which indus-
ries/languages entering the instruments are driving the results. In our
ase, the five most important sectors are information and communica-
ion, wholesale and retail trade, administrative and support service ac-
ivities, accommodation and food service activities, and financial and
nsurance activities. The three most important languages are German,
talian, and Portuguese. In the interest of brevity, we report the results
n Online Appendix E. 
As suggested by Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2020 , we test the ex-
lusion restriction by checking the correlation of the five most impor-
ant initial share and possible confounders. As confounders, we use the
hange (2005–2015) in vacancy rate, the change (2005–2015) in time
n market for rental properties, the change (2005–2015) in time on mar-
et for selling properties, the ownership rate in 2000, the growth (2005–
015) in ownership rate, and the share of unemployment in 2000. Re-














































































































D  ssuringly, this analysis shows that the initial shares are not related to
ossible confounders. 
.6. Shorter term supply responses 
We also investigate how our results change when shortening the
orizon of our analysis. Specifically, we compute rent, price, and stock
rowth over 2005–2010 and 2010–2015. We then estimate the usual in-
erse supply elasticities using the pooled data set comprising these two
ime intervals. To investigate whether inverse supply elasticity estimates
iffer between 2005–2010 and 2010–2015, we introduce an interaction
etween Δ log 𝑄 and a time dummy 𝐷 10−15 , which equals one over the
010–2015 period, and zero otherwise. 
Table 7 shows the results. The interaction term capturing different
nverse elasticities between 2005–2010 and 2010–2015 is significant
nly for the rent regressions in columns (4) and (6). 48 In general, the
ndings in Table 1 are confirmed for all specifications, as the coefficients
f the price equations are still greater than those of the rent equations
n both periods and, although lower in magnitude due to the interaction
erm, the amplification coefficient 𝜖𝑃 ,𝑅 is equal or greater than 2 also in
010–2015. 
. Conclusion 
In this paper, we investigate the response of housing supply with
espect to rent and price changes across space. Workhorse models in
rban economics typically feature rents, whereas the empirical litera-
ure on housing supply elasticities focuses on prices. This discrepancy
alls for a better understanding of the link between the responsiveness
f housing supply with respect to price and rent dynamics. 
Our empirical analysis indicates that residential housing supply in
witzerland reacts more than thrice as strongly to rent changes than
o price variations of the same magnitude. Rent and price elasticities
qual, on average, 1.44 and 0.42, respectively. Our conceptual frame-
ork attributes this “amplification effect ” to an adjustment of capitaliza-
ion rates – which reflect investors expectations concerning future rent
rowth and risk premia – following an exogenous demand shock. This
djustment is consistent with a myopic path-dependent view of residen-
ial development in the sense that investors believe that the places that
rew more (less) in the past will continue to do so also in the future.
n unexpected positive demand shock to a historically less attractive
rea thus triggers a considerable downward revision of investor’s cap-
talization rates, which further increases prices and, in the end, boosts
he amount of supplied housing. 
When zooming in at the neighborhood level, we document consid-
rable spatial heterogeneity in the local supply elasticities due to geo-
raphic and regulatory constraints. The supply responsiveness with re-
pect to both rent and price changes is very inelastic in major urban
enters and alpine tourist areas and more elastic in the countryside. A
omparison of the two elasticities at the local level reveals that the re-
ulting amplification effect is much lower in urban and tourist areas and
onsiderably higher in the countryside. 
This spatial variation of the supply amplification holds interesting in-
ights about the way investors perceive and influence residential devel-
pment at the local level. First, investors seem to form expectations re-
arding future rent growth and risk heterogeneously across space and at
 fine-scale level. Second, following a positive demand shock, investors
eem to revise their expectations only to a limited extent in tightly reg-
lated and geographically constrained places. In contrast, in less con-
trained areas, they revise their expectations significantly. 
Our results hold an essential lesson for policymakers. The impact of
olicies affecting rental income – such as housing subsidies and rent48 Note that Saiz (2010) also does not find major differences when scaling down 





14 ontrol – seem to have a much larger impact on housing supply, ceteris
aribus, than policies that act on the price of housing goods. Neglecting
his impact might lead to severe unintended consequences for housing
olicies aiming to stimulate or curb the housing market via the demand
ide. 
We conduct our analysis over a period of growing demand in the
wiss housing market. Whether the estimated supply amplification ef-
ect is symmetric, thus dampening housing supply during a downturn
f the real estate market remains an open question. Because housing is
urable, we do not expect an amplification mechanism to be present
hortly after a negative demand shock, as the supply elasticity with re-
pect to both rent and price changes will be zero. In the longer run, we
rgue that a negative demand shock, symmetric to the one we investi-
ated, might lead to a larger decrease in housing prices through higher
apitalization rates and, subsequently, lower housing supply. However,
esting this hypothesis remains a task for future research covering a dif-
erent phase of the housing cycle. 
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